Recent disputes between Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine regarding natural gas prices and transportation have caused several European states to qu esti on the reliability and security of their impo rted natural gas suppli es, and the wisdom of their overwhelrning reliance o n Russia. The question arises , however, as to what viable o ptions are available to European co untries. Som e have proffered the idea of replacing Russian natural gas supplies with increased imports of Norwegian o r Algerian gas. Other possible opti o ns include a more con1.prehensive and cooperative European stance toward Russia and the development of alternate o r ren ewable energy sources. Although the EU m ember states depend highl y upon Russian energy resources, Russia is also highly dependent, economically, upon the EU. The EU m arket is extremely important to Russia; both for energy reso urces and o ther commodities. Russia simply ca nn ot afford to overtl y dama ge that relati onship. Consequently, a united and cohesive effort in energy diplomacy by the EU would likely be strong eno ugh to pressure Russia on certain issu es and prevent futu re supply problems. Other possible solutio ns, such as diversifying natural gas suppliers and increasing alternate energy sources, simply involve too many logistical con cerns to be effective solutio ns. Cohesive and united energy diplom acy, however, would necessitate increased policy coordination which also presents several problems. Despite these problems, however, it remains the best optio n .
INTRODUCTION
T he notion of energy security has played all. increasingly important role in the realm of international affairs. The severe oil shocks that followed the 1973 Arab-Israeli conflict prompted many nations to more seriously consider the security of their energy supply. Following the conflict, the importance of energy security became a m aj o r priority for the developed world and related policies were permanently affixed near the top of the age ndas
The EU, Russia, and energy security of the world's majo r leaders. The inequitable spread of energy resources throughout the world has enriched som e states, while leaving others at a crucial disadvantage in economic and diplomatic relations. T he wealth of oil and natural gas in the Middle East has produ ced a host of " rentier states," nati o ns almost completely reliant on energy wealth for sustenance. T heir we' alth, subsequently, allows them to employ despotic political practices and unio ns between wealthy oil-states affo rd them the capacity to significantl y affect the global m arket price and supply. Conversely, countries devoid of significant en ergy wealth must oft en endure the price flu ctuati o ns that stem from foreign suppl y restrictions and expansio ns.
In recent years the E urop ean Union has fo und itself increasingly dependent on fo reign entities, primarily Russia, fo r its energy supplies. Russia is the largest producer of natural gas and the second largest p roducer of oil , directing a considerable quantity of its expo rted energy supplies into the E U market (Gelb 2007 , 2) . R ecent disputes, however, between Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine regarding natural gas prices and transportation have ca used several Europea n states to qu estion the reliability and security of their imported na tu ral gas supplies. In 2004, a Gas Coordinatio n Group was o rga nized by the Europea n Unio n (EP 2004, 95) . The m ain o bj ective of the gas coordinatio n group was to improve network coordination am o ng m ember states in the event of a supply disruption. Tho ugh the gro up has pelformed adequately in so m e instances, it has not demonstrated that it can be an effective tool for ensuring a secure and stable energy suppl y. Several m embers of the EU have also questioned the wisdom of their heav y reliance o n Russia to r natural gas. In light of the perceptio n of Russia's increasingly " aggressive" fo reign policy and use of energy diplomacy, many have suggested that E urope should pursue an alternate course.
The political impact and econ o mic levera ge w ielded by Russia on account of Europe's increasing dependency m ay harbor potentially dangerous implications to r the futu re. C onversely, dependence o n ' smaller, more cooperative, and less powerful states , such as N o rway or Algeria, likely does n o t entail the same precarious implications . The stabilizing Russian economy coupled with the b enefits of the continuo usly lu crative energy market have lessen ed, though by no m eans eliminated, Russia's n eed for international finan cial aid . As a res ult, Russia is able to shield itself from international criticisms or disregard them entirely (Trenin 2006,94) . Furthermore, the increasing dependence of several internati onal regions o n Russian energy has prornpted some natio ns to mute their criticisms of Russia's qu estio nable human rights record (Economides 2006 , 1) . T h e results, subsequently, are watered-down censures that Russia is likely to simply discount o r ignore. The remaining critics of the Kremlin 's policy, how ever, have characterized the administrdtio n's energy tactics as " tools of intimidati o n and blackm.ail," m eant to reassert Russian influence in the fo rmer-Soviet sphere (Wagstyl 2006, 1) . As Russia seeks to assert itself as an energy superpower and promote " Russian national interests," the prevalence of these tactics and the degree of intensity are likely to increase. Furthermore, as en ergy demands in Europe gradually climb, alo ng with their subsequent reliance o n Russian energy, Russia's corresponding economic levera ge and diplomatic strength will also increase. These recent events and the subsequent accusations, although admittedl y mino r, are indicative of the potential leverage of Russian energy supplies in the future. While Russian energy diplom acy m ay, currently, consist o nl y of minimizing criticism , future actio ns nuy include more overt pressure and ambitio us diplom atic effo rts in the broader European sphere. As a result, the increasing dependence of the E uropean Union o n Russian energy supplies portends an omino us European future.
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The qu estio n arises, consequ ently, as to what viable optio ns are available to the European Union. The most common respo nses have been the propositions asserting that the EU dive rsify its energy suppliers and promo te alternate energy sources. These propositio ns, however, are simply not viable solutions. There are too many obstacles impeding the po tential benefits o r success of these propositions. R eplacing Russian gas imports entails too many overwhelming logistical and legal concerns. Similarl y, considerable hurdles, both logistical and collabo rative, impede the development and implem entatio n of alternate and renewable energy resources . T he m ost promising and viable solution , consequently, is a unified and cohesive diplo matic effo rt. An asse rtive E uro pean diplomacy effo rt has the p otential to enhance European energy security and stability and em erges as the m ost fea sible opti on.
The wealth of literature on the subj ect fo cuses largely on the first two propositions. In 2006, the C;:ommissio n of the European Unio n published a green paper entitled, "A European Strategy fo r Sustainable, Competitive and Secure E nergy." Amo ng oth er issues the paper dealt with the stability and security of energy supply. T he proposal called fo r a di ve rsification of E urope's en ergy mix in o rder to lessen dependence on external suppli ers, but allowed each nati o n to determine their own energy m ix (EU Commission 2006, 9) .The proposal also discussed the formation o f a coh erent, external energy policy (EU Conunission 2006 , 14) . Unfo rtunately, instead of reinforcing the call fo r a stronger o r m ore united diplomatic line with concrete m easures, the proposal offered m inor suggestio ns that would do little m o re than m aintain the status qu o. T h e proposal called fo r the establishment of a new institutio nal group, the "Strategic E U Energy R eview (E U C omissio n 2006, 14)." Tho ugh maintaining potential as a future E U fo rum, the Strategic E U En ergy R eview would primarily concern itself with infrastructural issues and the evaluatio n of individual m ember states (EU C ommission 2006 , 15) . Furthermore, in regards to external diplomacy, the proposal advocates " partn erships" and "dialogue" with en ergy suppliers (E U Conunissio n 2006, 15) . Additio nal literature o n the subject presents similar proposals, advocating continued dialogue with Russia and tempered Russian-EU relati o ns (Bahga t 2006, 976) . Since the collapse of the Soviet Unio n in 1991, however, Russia has been incorporated into countless dialogues, partnerships, and councils with the E U and individu al E uropean states. Fo r example, Russia and the EU have held a regular and institutionalized energy dialogue fo r the past seve n years . Continued dialogue and new partnerships, consequentl y, fail to solve the fundamental problem. Russia wo uld likely prefer no thing more than to b e an established energy partner and secure continued access to European markets. A continued, tempered dialogu e doesn't impede Russia from practicing energy diplomacy, nor does it offer incentives fo r. Russia to cease doing so. Although, purpo rted partnerships and dialogues with Russia have been occurring regularly since the collapse of the Soviet Unio n , supply disruptions have still occurred and energy diplomacy has increased. Energy diplomacy is, by no m eans, an unreasonable o r unwa rranted Russian strategy. Characterized as the use of energy supplies to coerce competing nations and secure political adva ntages in the internati o nal community, en ergy diplom acy is practiced by virtually all natio ns that can m aintain energy adva ntages. Similarly, resource diplom acy is conUllon thro ughout history and m any nati o ns have sought to exert pressure in the international sphere by exploiting resource ad vantages. In light of Russia's recent histo ry, energy diplomacy is likely a w ise and profitable tactic. Securing expo rt m arkets fo r their natural gas
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The EU, Russia, and energy security and influencing prices provides necessary financial reli ef and the desired international presti ge. Tlus discussion does not seek to criticize Russia for its action . Instead, it seeks to evaluate the potential options available to the European Union and deternune wluch of those options are comparatively more feasible.
FEASIBILITY OF SUPPLY DIVERSIFICATION
In an efiort to redu ce the European Union 's potentially dangerous reliance on Russian gas, several EU burea ucrats and other Europea n voices have suggested that the EU diversify its supply options. This prospect, however, remains unfeasible at best. Russia is currentl y the world 's leading produ cer and exporter of natural gas, and holds 27% of proven natural gas resources. The EU imports 25% of its gas consumption, but the reliance of individual member states o n Russi~lI1 gas varies greatly . Germany impo rts 39% of its gas supplies trom Gazprom , the state-owned Russian gas monopoly, while Great Britain, a significant gas-producer, imports virtually no gas supplies at all (Gelb 2007, 2) . N ewly-accepted EU m ember countries , previously in the Soviet sphere, are overwhelnungly dependent on Russian gas supplies. Former m embers of the USSR , such as Estonia and Lithuania , impo rt over 98% of their gas supplies from Russia. France and Italy, while not as dependent as Germany, still import 31% and 24% respectively (Gelb 2007 ,2) . In effect, Russia has, over the past several decades, gradually and successfull y claim ed significant portions of the European energy market. The extent of their reach into EU markets, consequently, m akes it difiicult to simply replace Russian gas supplies.
In addition, logisti cal concerns complicate the proposal's viability. Russian pipelines already extend across the European landscape, with major transit routes running through Belarus, Poland, Germany, Ukraine, Slovakia, the Czech R epublic, and Hungary (Bahgat 2006, 9(9) . N ew pipelines are being planned and, to a lesser degree, b eing constructed under the Baltic Sea and in southern Europe. In contrast, Middle Eastern gas is largely destined for the Uluted States and Asian markets, and its transit infrastructure is correspondingly designed. Europe does import natural gas from Libya, Qatar, and Iran, and both Spain and France import a considerable portion of their natural gas from Algeria through the Maghreb-Europe pipeline (EIA 2007) . However, in order to replace or largely supplant Russian gas, these transit systems would necessitate substantial upgrades and expansion. The necessary infrastructural adjustments would require significant financial investment and decades of negotiation, development, and constru ctio n. All the while, Russian pipelin es stand ready and waiting with notable additions and expansions already underway.
Norway has also been suggested as an alternative to Russia . Norwegian natural gas acconU110dates approximately 15% of European gas consumption, and some have suggested that Norway has the potential to double its contribution (Ibson 2007, 11) . Norwegian gas deposits, however, are declining (Bahgat 2006, 9(3) . Also, similar to Russian gas imports, Norwegian gas is not equally distributed among European nations. Thus, while doubling its production may provide brief respite for some Western European nations, it would not be able to notably supplant Russian gas in the remaining European countries. Lastly, while Norwegian gas deposits are declining, European gas imports are steadily rising, making Norway unlikely to replace, even partially, Russian gas imports, unless that import dependence is curbed. H ence, an appeal to Norwegian gas is simply not a feasible solution.
Finally, individual European states have, and are continuing to extend, contractual obligations to Russia. In December of 2006, the major French national gas company, Gaz and influencing prices provides necessary financial reli ef and the desired international presti ge. Tlus discussion does not seek to criticize Russia for its action . Instead, it seeks to evaluate the potential options available to the European Union and deternune wluch of those options are comparatively more feasible.
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de France, renewed its contract with Gazprom and extended their supply agreernent through 2030 (Dempsey 2006, 1 (Simonian 2006, 5) . RWE Trangas, the Czech Republic's major gas distributor, also inked a long term deal with Russia late in 2006, renewing their supply contract and extending it to 2035. Diversifying away Russian gas now becomes a difficult propositio n , faced with varying legal obstructions. Essentially, individual European states are simply not endeavoring to reduce th eir reliance on Gazprom, and domestic energy firms have contr.lctuall y obligated them selves to continued reliance o n Russian gas imports. While tlus has the po tential oflessening the probability offuture supply disruptions, it also fo rces European states to negotiate individually with Russia. Individual negotiation with Russia , subsequently, allows Russia to exert considerably more pressure o n individual states than would be possible in a collective European efiort. Furthermore,Javier Solana, the EU h ead of Foreign Affairs has encouraged EU m ember-states to seek long term supply contracts with Ru ssia. Emphasizing the importan ce of a stable energy supply, Solana directed individual member states to make long-term agreements with Gazprom ). Solana's entreaty for contractual action breaks the recent EU trends calling for diversification of energy supplies, possibly indicating that such trends may be ineffective or unfeasible. Thus, while lIlany recogluze the po tential dangers of dependence o n Russia, efforts to ameliorate these dangers by diversifying supply options and partially supplanting Russian gas imports are simply not viable or realistic.
OBSTACLES TO RENEWABLE ENERGY DEVELOPMENT
Another oft-proposed solutio n to the European Union 's energy dilenU11a is the employment of alternate energy so urces. Specifically, the use of renewable energy sources as a m eans of nutigating dependence on imported fossil fu els. The Comnussion of the European Union has recently promulgated an ambitious strategy regarding energy conservation and diversificatio n . In January of 2007 , the ConU1ussion proposed instituting a target of 20% for renewable energy sources in EU energy consumption by 2020. This "energy-climate change package" also stipulates EU-wide and compulsory compliance (EU Commission 2007, 10-11). The proposition was widely acclaimed by conservationists and energy scientists. Furthermo re, research indicates that increasing the use of renewable energy sources, such as wind, solar, and biomass, is a realistic option (lEA 2007, 15-18) . Despite these positive advances, h owever, alternate energy sources and, specifically, renewable energy sources remain a difficult and unfeasible option. Several obstacles impede the institution and acluevement of this ambitious initiative. First, the determinatio n of acceptable ene rgy sources is disputed. Secondly, the logistics of the proposal present considerable difficulties. Lastly, the issue of mandatory compliance is already dissuading current members of the European Union.
The competing states of the European Union currently disagree on which renewable energy sources are acceptable. The principal item of discontent is nuclear power. Several EU natio ns, such as France and Slovakia, derive a significant po rtio n of the domestic energy suppl y form nuclear power (WNA 2007). France has since proposed am ending the current Comnussion proposal to allow the use of nuclear power as an alternative and renewable en ergy source. French ministers contend that EU support of such a policy will increase the de France, renewed its contract with Gazprom and extended their supply agreernent through 2030 (Dempsey 2006, 1 (Simonian 2006, 5) . RWE Trangas, the Czech Republic's major gas distributor, also inked a long term deal with Russia late in 2006, renewing their supply contract and extending it to 2035. Diversifying away Russian gas now becomes a difficult propositio n , faced with varying legal obstructions. Essentially, individual European states are simply not endeavoring to reduce th eir reliance on Gazprom, and domestic energy firms have contr.lctuall y obligated them selves to continued reliance o n Russian gas imports. While tlus has the po tential oflessening the probability offuture supply disruptions, it also fo rces European states to negotiate individually with Russia. Individual negotiation with Russia , subsequently, allows Russia to exert considerably more pressure o n individual states than would be possible in a collective European efiort. Furthermore,Javier Solana, the EU h ead of Foreign Affairs has encouraged EU m ember-states to seek long term supply contracts with Ru ssia. Emphasizing the importan ce of a stable energy supply, Solana directed individual member states to make long-term agreements with Gazprom ). Solana's entreaty for contractual action breaks the recent EU trends calling for diversification of energy supplies, possibly indicating that such trends may be ineffective or unfeasible. Thus, while lIlany recogluze the po tential dangers of dependence o n Russia, efforts to ameliorate these dangers by diversifying supply options and partially supplanting Russian gas imports are simply not viable or realistic.
The competing states of the European Union currently disagree on which renewable energy sources are acceptable. The principal item of discontent is nuclear power. Several EU natio ns, such as France and Slovakia, derive a significant po rtio n of the domestic energy suppl y form nuclear power (WNA 2007). France has since proposed am ending the current Comnussion proposal to allow the use of nuclear power as an alternative and renewable en ergy source. French ministers contend that EU support of such a policy will increase the The EU, Russia, and energy security use of nuclear technology and allow the EU to reach a higher threshold of renewable energy in their energy consumption . Currently, the European Union derives approximately 32% of its energy supply from nuclear power. Nuclear power, however, is an unacceptable option to several countries, such as Austria. In Austria, public opinion has decidedly opposed nuclear power and the construction of nuclear power plants since 1978. As a result , the inclusion of nuclear power as an option for renewable energy sources would appease France, but upset Austrian domestic politics. Conversely, wIllIe Austria would overwhelmingly support the exclusion of nuclear power in the EU proposal, it would simultaneously frustrate French eftorts. The nuclear obstacle and the inability, thus Elr, for European countries to agree, presents a clear difficulty in the development of alternate and renewable resources.
The logistics of the proposal also presents several financial and infrastructural difficulties for the EU countries. Current EU levels of renewable energy are approximately 6% of EU energy consumption (lEA 2007, 11) . The Commission's proposal to Illore than triple the current percentage necessitates an ambitious infrastructural upgrade. The technology and apparatus necessary for the large-scale generation of wind and solar power, and the production of biomass energy products, are simply not in place. The financial considerations are considerable, both for the construction and implementation of these programs as well as the necessary research and development. The proposal also requires a degree of policy coordination and implementation on a national level that is neither swift nor simple. In essence, the logistical hurdles are significant.
Furthermore, there are procedural disputes among EU members about the process of achieving the Commission's target. Among current procedural disputes is the idea of bundling (Crooks 2007, 1) . Bl1l1~ling essentially involves the control of distribution networks for gas and electricity. A "bundled" energy plan allocates control to energy suppliers while an "unbundled" plan ofters control to independent companies. The French energy minister, Fran<;:ois Loos, recently proposed adopting a system of regulated and restricted unbundling, similar to the French model. TIllS was largely rejected by many members of the European Union, especially the United Kingdom, which pressed for full and complete unbundling (Crooks 2007, 1) . These infrastructural and procedural issues, consequently, pose a significant problem to the effective development of new European energy options.
Finally, the Commission's energy plan has upset some EU states over its proposal for mandatory targets. The proposal sets two specific targets, both for 2020. The first stipulates that 20% of the European Union's energy supply must be renewable energy, and the second stipulates that 10% of the European Union's transport fuel must be biofuel (EU commission 2007,10-11) . The proposal further posits that the targets should be legally binding with the potential for punitive action. Germany has emerged as strong supporter for mandatory compliance, recently joined by the United Kingdom after a recent reassessment of security policy. However, several other nations, including Poland and France, have pressed for more flexibility in the matter (Euractiv c 2007) . These attitudes may indicate either a lack of conunitment or an air of pessinllsm. In either case, this behavior con1.plicates the potential for an increased use of renewable energy in the near future.
Policy initiatives, regarding energy, are not a new phenomenon in Europe. The last fifteen years have witnessed several efforts to induce an increased use of renewable energy. Unfortunately, member states have often failed to reach the targets. In 1997, the objective use of nuclear technology and allow the EU to reach a higher threshold of renewable energy in their energy consumption . Currently, the European Union derives approximately 32% of its energy supply from nuclear power. Nuclear power, however, is an unacceptable option to several countries, such as Austria. In Austria, public opinion has decidedly opposed nuclear power and the construction of nuclear power plants since 1978. As a result , the inclusion of nuclear power as an option for renewable energy sources would appease France, but upset Austrian domestic politics. Conversely, wIllIe Austria would overwhelmingly support the exclusion of nuclear power in the EU proposal, it would simultaneously frustrate French eftorts. The nuclear obstacle and the inability, thus Elr, for European countries to agree, presents a clear difficulty in the development of alternate and renewable resources.
Policy initiatives, regarding energy, are not a new phenomenon in Europe. The last fifteen years have witnessed several efforts to induce an increased use of renewable energy. Unfortunately, member states have often failed to reach the targets. In 1997, the objective http://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2007/iss1/7 was to increase the percentage of renewable energy in Europe to 12% of overall energy consumption by 2010 (EU Commission 1997, 9) . Recent evaluations, however, have characterized this goal as unattainable. A 21% share of renewable electricity in electricity production by 2010 was declared as the goal in 2001 (EP 2001,35) . Progress has been more favorable in this efiort, but most EU nations are not on track to reach their respective national targets. The European's Union continued inability to meet goals has undermined international confidence and expectations in their fulfillment, especia]]y when compliance is not legally binding.
The dilemma of European dependence on imported energy supplies remains a quandary. The conullonly proposed solutions simply do not offer a feasible resolution of the problem. Substituting away from Russian gas proves difficult because of logistical and legal concerns. Similarly, efforts to replace Russian gas with renewable energy sources face significant procedural and logistical impediments. Aside from these concerns, however, both proposals face a timing dilemma. Effective implementation of either policy would potentially require decades before they could provide a viable alternative to Russian energy. The financial and infrastru ctural concerns are significant impediments. Consequently, neither solution oilers an immediate response to the current situation. However, this does not preclude the simultaneous European pursuit of renewable energy sources or efforts at supply diversification along with the implementation of an alternative response. While these are not feasible short term responses, or viable long term solutions in and of themselves, the pursuit and implementation of these policies will likely ameliorate future European energy concerns. The Russian-EU energy relationship, however, is a pressing issue for many European states and requires a response in the inmlediate future. Furthermore, while the European Union 's potential for diversifying its energy mix and promoting alternate energy sources will increase in the future, its domestic energy demand will increase as well. Research estimates that the European Union wi]] import more than 50% of its natural gas from Russia by 2030 (lves 2007). Energy consumption, and, subsequently, energy demand, is increasing annually, meaning that the EU must address not only its present concerns, but its future concerns as we]]. As a result, the current dilenu11d necessarily calls tor a different solution.
THE CASE FOR DIPLOMACY
As an organization, the European Union comprises one of the most influential economic and political blocs in the world. The organization now includes twenty-seven member states and encompasses more than four-hundred and fifty mi]]ion people. Diplomatica]]y, the European Union, when it manages to act cohesively, is a daunting foe, and has the potential to secure important benefits for itself and its constituents. Consequently, because of its considerable influence, the most fe asible solution to the Russian natural gas dilemma is diplomacy. The most viable and potentia]]y effective solution available to the European Union is a united and cohesive diplomatic stance toward Russia. A solid and comprehensive policy line from the European Union could influence Russian behavior and induce beneficial and desired outcomes.
The changes in Russian conduct necessitate a change in the European Union's relations toward Russia. Russian forei gn policy behavior has recently been criticized as overly "aggressive" and even " imperialistic (Trenin 2006, 90) ." Russia's use of energy diplomacy has become increasingly more conm10n as they seek to exploit their was to increase the percentage of renewable energy in Europe to 12% of overall energy consumption by 2010 (EU Commission 1997, 9) . Recent evaluations, however, have characterized this goal as unattainable. A 21% share of renewable electricity in electricity production by 2010 was declared as the goal in 2001 (EP 2001,35) . Progress has been more favorable in this efiort, but most EU nations are not on track to reach their respective national targets. The European's Union continued inability to meet goals has undermined international confidence and expectations in their fulfillment, especia]]y when compliance is not legally binding.
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The EU, Russia, and energy security international advantage. An effective response to Russian behavior naturally entails an element of aggressiveness in the European Union's diplomatic efforts. Individu al asserti veness, however, is unlikely to be effective against the newly-reenergized Russian state. Instead, a cohesive diplomatic effort by the European Union as a whole offers the m ost plausible and effective solution. Unlike continued partnerships and dialogues, which constitute the bulk of the E uropean Union's diplomatic repertoire, a cohesive and assertive diplomatic stance would entail negative and credible consequences tor Russia , should it fail to acquiesce. The European Union could, among other options, threaten to restrict investm ent in the Russian energy sector or impede the £low of Russian goods into the E uropean market. In any case, the assertive nature of the diplomatic effort would necessitate the explicit and credible assertion of nega tive repercussions in the case of noncompliance. Furthermo re, su ch a diplomatic effort would necessarily require cohesion on the part of the European Union. Disunity and the failure of individual states to abide by the central diplomatic p osition would undermine the European diplomatic effort and afford Russia the opportunity to avoid negative repercussions throu gh bilateral negotiations. N aturally, aggressive or assertive behav ior does not necessarily imply violent or bellicose condu ct. Rather, a firm and unyielding policy line offers Europe the m ost potential in EU-Russian diplomacy. Several reasons validate the potential effectiveness of this approach. First, Russian dependence on European markets provides the European Union with important economic leverage. Second, cooperation , especiall y with organizatio nal su pport, is considerably more effective than unilateral pressure o r bilateral negotiation. Lastl y, assertive diplomacy offers a va riety of extraneous benefits.
The European Union has the potential for economic leverage because of Russian dependence on European markets. The majority of Russian energy is funneled into the E uropean Union, and 55% of Russian exports went to EU markets in 2004 . Naturally, that percentage is only increasing. Russia's energy transit infrastructure is also design ed largely to transport natural gas into E urope. A smaller percentage of their energy resources , naturally, is exported to other international markets. The infrastructure necessary to drastically increase that percentage simply isn't in place, nor is development under way. Consequently, Russia is dependent on a continu ed European demand. The Russian economy has recently been o n the rise, growing steadily since the financial crisis of 1998 (Trenin , 2003 . Russian economic success, however, remains relatively fragile because of its overdependence on the energy sector. Economic diversification is slowly m aterializing, but the process is, and has been, notably gradual. Global energy shocks, price reductions, or the loss of current market shares, consequently, all have the possibility of devastatingly impacting the Russian economy. Therefore, although Russia has behaved more aggressively because of its strengthened economic position, it simply cannot afford any major disruptions to its major export markets. The European Union, subsequently, retains important economic leverage because of the importance of its markets to Russia. This economic influence only persists, however, if the European Union is capable of acting in a unified, cohesive manner. Individual agreements and acquiescence by member states o nly undermine their ability to effectively induce beneficial outcomes.
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to European consumers and limit the scope of the current arrangements. The European Unio n could also threaten to increase natural gas imports from alternative global suppliers. Altho ugh tlus would no t be a feasible means of substantively replacing Russian gas, as described above, it would lead to significant short-term financial losses for the Russia n energy secto r. R ecent concerns have been presented relating to the long-term potential of Ru ssian gas supply (Ba hga t 2006,970) . Several developments are in progress that will expand Russia 's extraction and distribution potential, but investment in Russia's energy sector is woetlilly inadequate (Bahga t 2006, 97 1) . The European Union could also pressure the Russian energy secto r by restricting, impeding, o r discouragi ng investment and future lo ngterm natural gas contracts. In addition, the Europea n Union could encourage Russian acquiescence with carrots instead of sticks. Increased aid packages, minimized human rights criticisms, and wider access to Europea n markets are all positive diplomatic incentives that could po tentially generate Russian compliance. In effect, the diplomatic bargaining position of the European Unio n enj oys a variety of potential benefi cial avenues. A cohesive, unified stance, however, is absolutely necessa ry. If Russia is capable of securing these gains o r avoiding plllutive b ehavior through bilateral negotiati ons, then the strength of the Euro pean diplomatic position is lost. European cooperation is a necessary key.
Multilateral cooperatio n is a m o re effective means of conducting internatio nal diplomacy.This multilateral effort is especiall y effective ifit is concentrated against o ne state. In his discussion abo ut international cooperation and economic sanctions, D aluel Drezner, cOlnpares the effectiveness of unilateral, multilateral, and multilateral organizational economic sanctions (Drezner 2000, 73-102) . H e clearly asserts the superior effi cacy of multilateral organizational support. Essentially, multilateral efforts of economic sa ncti ons, accomplished through o rga nizatio nal support structures, are m ore effective than either unilateral o r multilateral sanctions (Drezner 200, 98) . T he o rga niza tio nal base provides a forum fo r cooperation, the m eans fo r circumventing domestic pressures, and a m edium for ensuring a som ewhat equitable distributio n of gains (Drezner 2000, 98) .While the European Union will not likely impose economic sanctions upon Russia , nor wo uld such a policy be wise, the application is clear. Multilateral efforts, especially when conducted within the confines of an internatio nal organization, are prone to produce m ore favorable results than other competing scenarios. Consequently, the European Union can most effectively press ure Russia and induce compliant behavior thro ugh cohesive and united multilateral efforts.
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The EU, Russia, and energy security however, would be extensive. E uropean cooperation, consequentl y, would be essential to the success of any such venture.
Assertive diplomacy may also be capable of inducing democratic or market reforms in Russia. Recent changes in Russian politics have been characterized by a decidedly neoauthoritarian streak (Trenin 2006, 92) . As Russia's economic situation improves and its energy diplomacy becomes more prevalent, it is more capable of insulating itself from external pressures (Trenin 2006, 94) . International criticisms have, subsequently, largely fallen on deaf ears. Economic pressures, however, may have more influence on the Russian governm ent. Such a proposition is admittedly optimistic and short-term reversal of Russian political trends is extremely unlikely. Nevertheless, few tactics, short of military aggression, are Tnore persuasive than economic diplomacy. In essence, an assertive, cohesive, and unified diplomatic stance towards Russia offers the European Union the possibility of achieving more than just a stable and secure energy supply.
OBSTACLES TO DIPLOMATIC COOPERATION
T he propensity for effecti ve collusion , however, is not encouraging. While an assertive and united policy stance would likely offer the most beneficial results to the European Union, implementation of such a policy is unlikely. As a scheme of regional integration and large-scale cooperation, the European Union is, by far, the m ost pronlinent and promising example in the world. Nevertheless, an inability to effectively cooperate is not new problem for the European Unio n . T heir history is rife with dilemmas and policy concerns on w hich the member states could not successfully compronuse. The current circumstances surrounding the energy security dilenuna appear to offer a sinular conclusion. Tlus appears to be the case for several reasons. First, the problems of energy security and stability have varyi ng levels of priority am ong E uropean national governments. Second , cooperation on diplomatic and foreign policy initiatives has been a notably difficult proposition. Lastly, the uncertainty of the potential for coop eration prompts several states to seek bilateral solutions.
Energy dependence and energy supply sources vary considerably among EU states. Consequently, energy security is a pressing issue for some nations, and a less priority for o thers. Germany imports nearly 40% of its natural gas from Russia and for several Eastern bloc countries, such as Poland or the Baltic States, the percentage is considerably higher (Gelb 2007 , 2) . France and Italy obtain sigluficant p o rtions of their domestic gas supply, as mentioned above, from Gazprom and Austria is reliant o n the Russian natural gas giant for 69% of its domestic supply (Gelb 2007, 2) . As a result, disruptions in Russian natural gas transit and dep endence on Russian natural gas resources are a significant con cern. G reat Britain and Spain, conversely, import virtually no natural gas from Russia at all and the N etherlands purchases only 6% of their natural gas supply from Gazprom (Gelb 2007,2) . For these nations, and others with comparably low percentages, the stability and security of Russian gas supplies is simply a less-relevant issue. The varying degree of priority for energy security, consequently, inhibits effective cooperation . Countries with less invested in the result are simply less prone to make substantial efforts than countries with comparably m ore at stake. This issue, consequently, weakens the potential for cohesive diplomatic cooperation.
The issue of energy security, despite maintaining significant econonllc overtones, cannot be separdted from the political or foreign policy arena. The pervasive presence of Russia in energy disp utes and the role of en ergy in econo nuc and political stability necessarily make the Russian-EU energy relationship an important foreign policy issue. however, would be extensive. E uropean cooperation, consequentl y, would be essential to the success of any such venture.
The issue of energy security, despite maintaining significant econonllc overtones, cannot be separdted from the political or foreign policy arena. The pervasive presence of Russia in energy disp utes and the role of en ergy in econo nuc and political stability necessarily make the Russian-EU energy relationship an important foreign policy issue.
Cooperati o n on. foreign policy issues has been attempted in the European Union fo r decades, with limited results. T he Maastricht Treaty of the early 1992 created a new pillar in the EU stru cture and institutionalized the no ti on of a common fore ign policy stance. Europea n fo reign policy, however, has been highlighted by disagreem ents and disputes fo r the past two decades. German reunific atio n proved to be divisive issue, especially amo ng the larger E U powers (H oftinan 2000, 191) . Europea n inacti on and incoherence m arked the initial Yu goslav conflict, with Great Britain and France opposing German behavio r (H oftillan 2000, 192) . T h e recent wa r in Iraq also emphasized a divide in E uropean foreign policy ideals am o ng G reat Britain , Fra nce, Germany, Spain, and Italy. N aturally, efforts of fo reign policy co operation have not all been so polarized and conflicting (S mith 2004 102) . N everth eless, several important internati onal events were highlighted by inconsistent Europea n poli cy stances . T his histo ry o f cooperation , or lack thereof, consequently, is no t encouraging fo r Euro pean cooperati o n o n energy security.
T he uncertainty of the Europea n U nion 's CFSP (Conullo n Foreign and Security Policy) and internal cooperation prompt m ember states to seek bilateral arrangem ents w ith Russia. T his document has already highlighted recent agreem ents in France and Italy w ith Gazpr011l. German cooperation with R ussia has also been significant, and several states continue to seek bilateral agreem ents with Russia . Wlul e the potential beneti ts of a l11uted diplomatic effort are generall y greater than individual arrangem ents, the uncertainty and unlikelihood of cohesive E uropean cooperation causes individual states to pursue m o re probable benefits. Similar to the prisoner's dilenuna, the ratio nal entity seeks the m ost certain gains rather tha n the greates t gains. Consequently, European cooperation o n energy security issues rem ains an unlikely proposition.
CONCLUSION
T he European dilenuna involving the security of natural gas rem ai ns a crucial issue. The ava ilable options, however, all suffer from potential impediments. N evertheless, the most feasible and b eneficial o ptio n is the fo rrnati o n of a cohesive, assertive, and unified European policy. While cooperative difticulties certainly hinder the potential im plem entati on of su ch a policy, the European U nion is capable of overconung these difticulties (Snuth 2004, 131) . Furtherm o re, the difficulties inherent in a cohesive policy line are considerably less than those presented in other strategies. R eplacing Russian natural gas imports is a difficult and unreasonable propositio n . The prevalence of Russian gas in the European market, the nature of transit infrastructures, and the produ cti on potential of som e supplier countries, such as N orway, all prevent a substitution away fro m Russian natural gas. T he development and implem entati on of alternate and renewable energy sources also succumbs to substantial obstacles. T he E uropean Unio n's history with renewable energy initiative, collaborative concerns, and logistical difticulties all indicate that renewable energy sources are not the solutio n to the EU -Russian energy relatio nship. T he development of renewable energy so urces is certainly a laudable effo rt and sh ould be vigorously pursued. N evertheless, it simply cannot present itself as a solution to Russian natural gas and energy diplomacy.
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The EU, Russia, and energy security international diplomacy and foreign policy, the European Union must respond in kind. An aggressive, assertive response, reinforced by a united European polity, has the potential to secure important benefits. European assertiveness would neutralize Russia 's confident energy diplomacy, and create a situation where the European Union could pressure Russia in certain spheres. Naturally, such a policy does not include violence or threats of military aggression. Instead, the strategy rests upon a unified effort and a finn, unyielding policy line. EU-wide cooperation is essential. Individual negotiation with Russia places many European states at a considerable disadvantage and allows Russia to largely impose its policy lines. Consequently, despite the potential hindrances, an assertive, coh esive, and unified diplomatic stance is the most rational , feasible, and beneficial course of action for the European Union.
The issue of energy security will continue to grow and will continue to be a fundamental part of the agenda of the European Union. The energy disputes with Russia will not solve themselves and a resolution must be found. Energy demand and consumption will only continue to grow as the new century progresses and energy diplomacy by Russia and the Middle East will becom e increasingly more prevalent. As a result, it is essential that Europe finds a m ethod for addressing this concern. The most efiective method is an aggressive and unified diplomatic stance toward Russia by the European Union as a collective entity. Despite the potential hindrances and inherent difficulties in diplomatic cooperation, the diplomatic avenue remains both the most teasible and the potentially most beneficial course of action. Consequently, while the European Union should continue its efforts to promote a diverse energy mix and the use and development and renewable energy sources, it should emphasize the need for cohesive and collective diplomacy. Obstacles to cooperation have existed since the inception of the European ConU11Unity and the European states have demonstrated them.selves capable of overcoming those difficulties. In order to effectively address the current energy situation, the European Union must once again overcome the inherent difficulties of cooperation and form an assertive and unified diplomatic policy.
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